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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
CHALLENGING THE REMITTITUR ORDZR
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co.
Upon determining that an exorbitant jury verdict has been
awarded, a trial court judge may grant the plaintiff an election to
either voluntarily remit a stated portion of his award or submit to
a new jury trial for a redetermination of damages.' Pursuant to the
traditional rule, a claimant who consents to an order of remittitur
following a jury trial waives his right to appellate review of the
reduced judgment, 2 whereas a plaintiff who opts to submit to a new
trial cannot challenge the propriety of the remittitur until a final
judgment has been entered in the subsequent trial. 3 Recently, this
longstanding procedural maxim has become the subject of substan-
tial criticism based on both constitutional and equitable considera-
tions.4 Against this backdrop, the Second Circuit, in Donovan v.
I The remittitur device apparently originated in Justice Story's circuit court decision in
Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C. Mass. 1822), and soon became well established
in the federal courts. See, e.g., Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973); Collum v.
Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970). Such a procedural tool, it is argued, promotes both
finality and efficiency in the judicial process. Evans v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d 519, 522
(2d Cir. 1976). This practice, nevertheless, has been severely questioned on constitutional
grounds as infringing upon the province of the jury in violation of the seventh amendment.
See, e.g., Busch, Remittiturs and Additurs in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 12
DEF. L.J. 521 (1963) (remittitur should only be used in those cases where the jury has returned
a verdict which is flagrantly extravagant); Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q.
1 (1942) (remittitur practice is inconsistent with one's right to have questions of fact resolved
by a jury); James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial on Some
or All Issues, Remittitur and Additur, 1 DUQ. L. REv. 143 (1963) (remittitur will probably not
be overturned despite its questionable constitutional basis); Comment, Correction of Damage
Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 YALE L.J. 318 (1934). See generally 6A MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05[31 (2d ed. 1974); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2815 (1973). Despite this concern, and notwithstanding the noticeable lack
of precedent for Justice Story's cornerstone decision, the Supreme Court has impliedly ap-
proved use of this discretionary procedural device. See, e.g., Banks v. Chicago Grain Trim-
mers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1968); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484-87 (1935); Union
Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 334 (1918); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S 397, 411-12 (1896).
2 See generally 6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05[3] (2d ed. 1974); Comment,
Waiver of Right to Appeal, 39 NEB. L. REv. 739 (1960).
3 See, e.g., Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969). For a discussion of the final judgment rule, see notes 31 &
49 infra.
I The traditional reviewability rule has been questioned in several recent cases, see notes
29-38 and accompanying text infra, and law review commentary. E.g. Note, Remittitur Prac-
tice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 299 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Columbia
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Penn Shipping Co.,5 had its first direct opportunity to assess the
continued validity of this rather narrow but significant principle of
adjective law. Reaffirming the conventional view, a divided panel'
held that a litigant who voluntarily accedes to a remittitur "with or
without qualifications" is "bound by his acceptance" and may not
subsequently challenge the propriety of the reduced verdict.7
In 1970, Francis Donovan suffered serious physical injuries
while employed by the Penn Shipping Co. Subsequently, he insti-
tuted a Jones Act 8 suit against his employer in the Southern District
of New York.' As compensation for his losses, a jury awarded Dono-
van $90,000 in damages. In response to the defendant's motion to
set aside the verdict as excessive, then District Judge Gurfein found
the award to be unreasonable and ordered a new trial unless plain-
tiff agreed to remit $25,000.1o After a one-year delay, the plaintiff,
attempting to preserve a right to appeal without having to first
submit to a new trial, consented to the remittitur "under protest
without prejudice to his right to appeal therefrom."', Shortly there-
after, Donovan sought review of the judgment entered upon the
reduced verdict. The Second Circuit, however, refused to entertain
the appeal."
In support of its decision disallowing appeal from an order of
remittitur accepted "under protest," the Donovan majority stressed
two factors. 3 First, the court emphasized that judicial economy
Note]; Note, Appealability of Judgments Entered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal Courts,
1975 DUKE: L.J. 1150 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Duke Note]; Comment, Remittitur Review:
Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated and Unliquidated Damage Cases, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 376 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment].
536 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1976)
(No. 76-613).
6 The majority consisted of Judges Lumbard and Hays. Judge Feinberg authored a
dissenting opinion.
7 536 F.2d at 538.
I 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) provides that any seaman injured "in the course of his employ-
ment" has the right to maintain a suit for damages in federal court and guarantees the right
of trial by jury in such action.
I Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., No. 70-3572 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1974).
10 Id., slip op. at 7-8. Judge Gurfein was sitting as a district judge prior to his elevation
to the court of appeals.
I No. 70-3572 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1975) (judgment) (emphasis added). The judgment was
entered by Judge Werker who was assigned to the case after Judge Gurfein was appointed to
the Second Circuit. 536 F.2d at 537 n.1.
22 536 F.2d at 538.
13 While emphasizing only two aspects of the remittitur controversy, the majority indi-
cated that the Second Circuit had previously considered the problem in detail. Id. at 537,
citing Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975), and Evans
v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1976). Careful analysis of these opinions, however,
1977]
406 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:404
indicates that although the Reinertsen and Evans panels identified the various facets of the
remittiturproblem, they did not reconcile these considerations. In Reinertsen, the plaintiff,
an employee injured in an on-the-job accident, received a $75,000 jury verdict in his favor.
The trial judge, however, ordered a new trial unless Reinertsen agreed to remit $30,000 of his
recovery. Refusing to consent to the reduction of his award, the plaintiff opted to submit to
a new trial, only to receive a much larger abatement at the hands of a second jury. Upon
hearing Reinertsen's appeal, the Second Circuit refused to either set aside the latter damage
award as inadequate or reverse the original remittitur. The court also rejected the plaintiff's
contention that since he had not had an opportunity to immediately appeal the remittitur,
he should now be allowed to accept it in lieu of the second verdict. The court noted that rather
than immediately appealing the trial judge's remittitur order, the plaintiff sought a writ of
mandamus instructing the district court to "enter the . .. [reduced] award in such form
that . . [he could] appeal from such judgment." 519 F.2d at 533. His petition was denied
because mandamus is "granted ... only under exceptional circumstances," id. at 536, and
the second trial resulted. Thus, since the plaintiff did not appeal from the order, resolution
of the reviewability issue was not necessary for a disposition of the case at bar. Nevertheless,
the court took the opportunity to analyze both sides of the appealability question, examining
earlier pertinent Second Circuit decisions and discussing the practice of the other circuits.
See id. at 534-35. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Feinberg noted that various policy
considerations required further investigation before a conclusive determination of the prob-
lem could be made. Consequently, the court decided to postpone resolution of the issue until
such time as it "squarely" presented itself before the court. See id. at 536. In the aftermath
of Reinertsen, notwithstanding the court's unequivocal statements in its decision, many
commentators believed that the Second Circuit was about to depart from the conventional
rule. See Columbia Note, supra note 4, at 320 n.148; 44 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 845, 850 (1976).
Shortly thereafter, in Evans, the Second Circuit was presented with another opportunity
to discuss remittitur practice. In that case, the plaintiff had initially received a $60,000 jury
verdict in compensation for personal injuries sustained while employed by the Calmar Steam-
ship Co. Upon the defendant's motion, however, the trial judge found the award to be exces-
sive and ordered a new trial unless Evans consented to remit $20,000. The plaintiff elected
to submit to a new trial. While the second trial was in progress, the claimant belatedly opted
to agree to the proposed remittitur. When the defendant agreed, the recently empanelled jury
was dismissed and the new trial judge executed an order extending the time for Evans'
acceptance of the remittitur to that day. The order, it should be noted, stated that it was
without prejudice to claimant's right to appeal following the entry of a final judgment.
Subsequently, Evans sought review of the $40,000 judgment. See 534 F.2d at 519-22. The
Second Circuit, however, disposed of Evans' appeal as follows:
We hold that by agreeing to accept the remittitur after a jury had been empanelled
at the second trial, such action was the equivalent to a settlement of the action and
having settled the action there was nothing from which to appeal. . . . Once the
plaintiff has elected to go the route of a second trial he must see it through to
judgment if he has any desire to complain of what was done either as a result of
the first trial, or as a result of the second trial.
Id. at 522. Therefore, as in Reinertsen, the court was confronted with a controversy which
did not turn upon resolution of the appealability question. Unlike the Reinertsen panel,
however, the Evans court suggested that, when faced with the controversial issue in the
future, it would adhere to the deep-rooted traditional rule. See id. In authoring the Evans
opinion, Judge Lumbard expressed the judiciary's view that any alteration in conventional
procedure would significantly increase the workload of the appellate courts. See id. He con-
tended that the remittitur order often "provides the means" for bringing litigation to an end
in that by acceptance of the reduced verdict and payment of the judgment, the expense and
inconvenience of a second trial are avoided. Id. Should the plaintiff's position be accepted,
the court maintained, every plaintiff would be assured of his minimum verdict and would
have no reason not to pursue an appeal of the remittitur "under protest." See id. Concluding
that judicial inefficiency and not economy would be the result, Judge Lumbard expressed
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would be best promoted by continuation of the bar against direct
appeals" from orders of remittitur.15 If the rule were otherwise, the
majority posited, "[tihe proliferation of appeals would be the inev-
itable consequence," for plaintiffs would freely accept remittiturs
"under protest" and then immediately appeal to have their original
verdicts reinstated. 6 Second, the court noted that a defendant
might be prejudiced by allowing a claimant to bypass a second trial
and obtain prompt review of the remittitur.'7 The majority opined
that if the first jury's determination of damages is unreasonable, the
defendant should not be denied the right to have the issue consid-
ered by a second jury.'8 Thus, fearing that a departure from estab-
lished practice would both prejudice the defendant's right to a jury
trial and increase the administrative burdens of an already over-
crowded court system, the majority characterized "orders of remitti-
disapproval of direct review of remittitur orders, regardless of whether they were accepted
"under protest." See id. at 522-23.
1 Pursuant to the prevailing practice, a plaintiff faced with a remittitur order normally
has but two alternatives. He may refuse to consent to the reduction, in which case a new trial
must be held, see, e.g., Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1972), or he may choose to
accept the reduced verdict and thus hopefully freeze his recovery at the reduced amount, see,
e.g., Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974). By taking this latter course
of action, the claimant is held to have acquiesced in the judgment and waived his right to
challenge it on appeal. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrE AND
PROCEDURE § 2815, at 105-06 (1973). Where the defendant seeks appellate review of the
reduced judgment, however, a new avenue for the plaintiff may be opened, viz., the cross-
appeal. The Second Circuit has rendered apparently conflicting decisions in this area.
Compare Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858
(1949) (denying cross-appeal of remittitur by plaintiff), with Burris v. American Chicle Co.,
120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941) (indicating that cross-appeal is available). If the Mattox case is
still viable, a plaintiff in the Second Circuit cannot challenge the propriety of a judge's
reduction of a jury award, even by means of a cross-appeal. The distinction between direct
appeals and cross-appeals is quite important, for a better argument can be made for allowing
a cross-appeal by a remitting plaintiff than a direct appeal since in the former situation the
entire dispute will nevertheless be brought before an appellate court by the dissatisfied
defendant. Thus, disallowing cross-appeals by remitting plaintiffs certainly does not encour-
age judicial economy. On the contrary, efficient judicial administration may best be achieved
by permitting such appeals, since a defendant may reconsider further challenging an already
reduced trial court judgment if he knows that by doing so he will thereby open the door for
an appeal by the plaintiff. See generally 49 N.C.L. REv. 141 (1970).
11 536 F.2d at 537. Earlier, in Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d
531 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit considered the effect that adoption of the "under
protest" rule would have upon judicial economy. As an aid to its determination, the court
indicated its desire for the implementation of a statistical study of the district courts to
analyze the remittitur problem. Id. at 536. While apparently no such study has been made,
the Donovan court nevertheless reached the conclusion that the "under protest" rule would
foster judicial inefficiency. 536 F.2d at 537.
z 536 F.2d at 537.
" Id. at 538.
I d.
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tur as interlocutory and therefore unappealable," regardless of any
qualifications which a plaintiff might attach to his acceptance of
such an order.'9
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Feinberg maintained
that the court should allow an appeal by a claimant who relin-
quishes "his right to a new trial and accepts a remittitur 'under
protest.' ",20 Declaring that the rights of the parties should take pre-
cedence over the desire to foster judicial efficiency, Judge Feinberg
emphasized the hardship that the traditional rule works on the
plaintiff.2' Since the only manner in which a claimant may chal-
lenge a trial judge's order of remittitur is by initially "undergoing
the risk, delay and expense of a second trial," the dissent main-
tained that a party confronted with such an order lacks a meaning-
ful opportunity to protest the trial judge's exercise of discretion.22
Believing that a plaintiffs "right to the jury verdict" may not be
cast aside so readily, Judge Feinberg questioned the constitution-
ality of the present practice.23
After an examination of the plaintiff's plight, Judge Feinberg
turned to a consideration of the effect which remittitur has upon the
defendant. He noted that a defendant can promptly seek review of
a trial judge's refusal to order a new trial or a remittitur.2 4 Moreover,
a defendant may also appeal from the inadequacy of a remittitur
that has actually been accepted; thus, a claimant may be forced to
face the protracted litigation which he had hoped to avoid by remit-
ting.21 Judge Feinberg concluded that the present remittitur proce-
," Id. at 537. The majority declared that the plaintiff, having agreed to the reduction,
was "bound by his decision just as if he had reached a settlement with his adversary." Id. at
536. If a plaintiff seriously objects to the trial judge's diminution of the award, the majority
continued, he should refuse to accept the reduction and proceed to a second trial. Id.
21 Id. at 541 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
21 Judge Feinberg observed:
[The plaintiff] is offered a reduced verdict right away. Should he refuse, in order
to regain the full amount of the verdict he must first undergo the delay and trouble
of a second trial, perhaps obtain a lower verdict, and then try to persuade an
appellate court that the trial judge erred in reducing the first verdict.
Id. at 539 (footnote omitted).
22 Id. at 538-39. The dissent suggested that even if a claimant who had refused to accede
to a remittitur were to be awarded a higher verdict by the second jury, the trial judge probably
would set it aside again. Id. at 539 n.4.
21 Id. at 539. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra.
24 536 F.2d at 540-41 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). This aspect of remittitur procedure has
been utilized frequently by defendants. See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797
(2d Cir. 1961); Ballard v. Forbes, 208 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d
576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187
F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1951) (per curiam); Boyle v. Bond, 187 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
21 536 F.2d at 541 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). It should be noted that there are many cases
[Vol. 51:404
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dure already favors the defendant, and thus adoption of the "under
protest" rule would merely reduce this imbalance." Hence, refusing
to give much weight to the majority's predictions of an increased
appellate workload, cognizant of the coercive effect which the estab-
lished rule tends to have upon a plaintiff, and sensitive to possible
seventh amendment ramifications, Judge Feinberg advocated per-
mitting a plaintiff to challenge remittiturs accepted "under pro-
test.""
The Second Circuit, in Donovan, chose to maintain traditional
remittitur procedure notwithstanding the recent criticism which
that approach has engendered. 28 This criticism, however, has caused
other courts to reevaluate the traditional rule. 9 Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit has completely abandoned this aspect of conventional re-
mittitur practice and now permits a plaintiff to obtain direct appel-
late review of remittitur orders accepted "under protest."3 In de-
parting from traditional procedure, it was necessary for that court
to skirt the imposing barrier to appeal posed by the final judgment
rule.3' The Fifth Circuit surmounted this obstacle by maintaining
illustrating this facet of traditional remittitur practice. For example, in Smith v. Welch, 189
F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1951), the trial court ordered a $10,000 remittitur to which the plaintiff
agreed. Thereafter, the defendant sought appellate review of the reduced judgment which had
been entered in the claimant's favor. The Tenth Circuit, however, held that the $25,000
recovery awarded to the plaintiff, following the reduction of a $35,000 jury verdict, was not
excessive. Id. at 838.
' 536 F.2d at 541 (Feinberg, J., dissenting), citing Carrington, The Power of District
Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507, 526 (1969).
27 536 F.2d at 541 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
21 See generally Columbia Note, supra note 4; Duke Note, supra note 4; Chicago Com-
ment, supra note 4. Interestingly, in the latter article, the author distinguishes between cases
in which damages can be clearly measured and cases in which no such recovery standards
exist, such as personal injury actions. Emphasizing the distinction between matters of law
and matters of fact, the author asserts that there is no constitutional barrier to either remitti-
tur or direct remittitur review in those cases where there exist liquidated damages which may
be accurately determined by the court as a matter of law. In the other class of cases, however,
the author maintains that remittitur itself is an unconstitutional mechanism and that appel-
late review would merely compound the unfairness "without remedying trial court invasions
of the jury's function." Chicago Comment, supra note 4, at 397. It would seem preferable,
however, that so long as remittitur is used in both situations, a claimant should be able to
obtain immediate review in all cases.
'7 See notes 30-38 and accompanying text infra.
' See, e.g., Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Fran. R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975); Gorsalitz
v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921,
modified on other grounds, 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972).
'7 The final judgment rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), provides: "The courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States . . . ." Although causing litigation over the meaning of a "final" decree, the
rule does eliminate the problems created by piecemeal adjudication of judicial controversies.
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that direct appeal from an order of remittitur does not offend the
federal policy against piecemeal review.32 Irrespective of the decision
reached by an appellate tribunal, the court maintained, no subse-
quent trial is needed to conclude the litigation.3 3 More specifically,
the court reasoned that if the plaintiff succeeds on appeal, the origi-
nal verdict will be reinstated, whereas should the defendant prevail,
judgment will be entered upon the properly reduced verdict. 4 The
only limitation imposed on this procedure by the Fifth Circuit is
that a claimant must unequivocally accept the remittitur "under
protest.''35 The First 36 and Sixth37 Circuits, while not abandoning the
See generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 557 (1932);
Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders - A Structural Reform Toward
Redefinition, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1037, 1039-40 (1973).
32 See, e.g., Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973).
31 Id. at 1283.
31 Id. It should be noted that the Wiggs court neglected to consider two other possibilities:
The appellate court might (1) alter the amount of the remittitur, or (2) order a new trial.
These dispositions are quite uncommon, however, as evidenced by the noticeable lack of
illustrative case law.
3 See, e.g., id. at 1282; Minerals & Chems. Philipp Corp. v. Milwhite Co., 414 F.2d 428
(5th Cir. 1969); Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). Use of
the "under protest" language avoids unfairness by providing the defendant with notice of the
conditional nature of the plaintiff's acceptance. Although the Fifth Circuit requires that the
remitting plaintiff accept "under protest," it is not settled whether he must also refrain from
collecting his reduced judgment to preserve the right to challenge the remittitur immediately.
Compare United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1970), with Stein-
berg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966), and Delta Eng'r Corp. v.
Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
31 In Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam),
the plaintiff consented, apparently without qualification, to the trial judge's order of remitti-
tur. Upon review, the First Circuit assumed that an appeal would lie from an accepted
remittitur. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court, however, the appel-
late court declared that plaintiff's cross-appeal was meritless. Id. at 94. Hence, it appears as
though the First Circuit will permit a remitting claimant to challenge an order of remittitur,
at least by means of a cross-appeal. It remains to be seen, however, whether the First Circuit
will extend this holding to direct appeals and require all future remitting litigants to clearly
indicate the conditional nature of their consent.
31 In Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam),
the Sixth Circuit concluded that a Tennessee statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955),
allowing a direct appeal from an accepted order of remittitur was applicable to federal courts
sitting in that state. Based upon the rationale expressed in Mooney, the Sixth Circuit has
continued to allow remitting plaintiffs to prosecute appeals in diversity actions where state
statutory law permits. See, e.g., Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); Manning v Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973).
Recently, the Sixth Circuit's procedure of applying state law to determine the availabil-
ity of an immediate appeal from an order of remittitur has been severely questioned. Con-
tending that the Sixth Circuit's practice represents a misapplication of the rule enunciated
in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), commentators have generally agreed that
the issue of reviewability of remittiturs accepted "under protest" is one which the federal
courts should resolve without recourse to state law. See, e.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
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traditional rule completely, have also chosen to diverge from con-
ventional practice. It appears, however, that the remaining federal
forums have elected to adhere to traditional procedure.38
Although the Donovan court's conservative ruling might appear
consistent with most precedent, including a few early Supreme
Court decisions, 39 it is submitted that the Fifth Circuit's approach
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2802 (1973); Duke Note, supra note 4, at 1151-55.
In Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.
1967), the Seventh Circuit was also highly critical of the Sixth Circuit's practice. Emphasiz-
ing the policy considerations behind Erie, viz., equitable administration of law and the
discouragement of forum shopping, and the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965), wherein the supremacy of federal procedural rules in the federal courts
was reaffirmed, the Dorin court refused to allow a claimant to take advantage of a pertinent
Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 366(b)(2)(ii) (Smith-Hurd 1976), which allows
remitting litigants to prosecute cross-appeals. 382 F.2d at 78-79.
Indeed, in light of the Hanna decision, the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Mooney appears
suspect, for the federal courts should be able to determine the scope of their appellate review
independent of state law. Although the application of state procedure might have been
acceptable under the "outcome-determinative" test established by Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), whereby state law controlled matters which affected the ultimate
outcome of litigation, it is certainly questionable in the aftermath of Hanna. It is submitted
that given the parameters set by Erie and Hanna, the application of federal procedural rules
for the appealability of remittiturs would seem to be proper.
11 See, e.g., S. Birch & Sons v. Martin, 244 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
837 (1957), wherein the Ninth Circuit agreed that a claimant who had consented to a remitti-
tur was precluded from questioning the validity of the reduction on appeal. The plaintiff,
however, apparently attached no qualifications to his acquiescence in the reduced judgment.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has rigidly followed conventional practice. See Collum v.
Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); Rothschild v. Drake Hotel, Inc., 397 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.
1968); Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.
1967); Casko v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 361 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966). It is interesting to note that
in Collum, the Seventh Circuit considered and rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach to remit-
titur review. 421 F.2d at 1259.
It is uncertain, however, whether the Third Circuit still adheres to traditional practice.
See Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973), wherein the plaintiff was allowed to consent to a
remittitur "without prejudice to the exercise of what ever right of appeal" he might have. In
reversing the district court decision, both parties having appealed, the Third Circuit made
no mention of this procedural innovation. Thus, Thomas is not clear authority for permitting
appellate review of judgments entered pursuant to orders of remittitur, since substantive
considerations precluded the circuit court from deliberating on the remittitur issue.
' See Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver
Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131
U.S. 22 (1889). Numerous lower federal court decisions upholding the validity of traditional
remittitur procedure have relied heavily upon these Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., S. Birch
& Sons v. Martin, 244 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957). See generally
6A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05[3], at 59-63 (2d ed. 1974).
It is submitted, however, that these Supreme Court cases are distinguishable from
Donovan and therefore should not be controlling. In Kennon, it was held that an intermediate
appellate court may not enter an absolute judgment for a lesser award than that determined
by the jury and thus deprive the plaintiff of an election to either remit or face a new trial. In
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is preferable. By stressing only the issues of judicial economy and
fairness to defending litigants, the Donovan majority appears to
have engaged in a rather superficial analysis of the remittitur con-
troversy. While the Second Circuit's reluctance to adopt a rule
which might hinder the efficiency of the appellate system is justi-
fied, it is suggested that adoption of the Fifth Circuit's "under pro-
test" rule would not produce the detrimental effects which the
Donovan court envisioned. In view of the rather stringent standard
discussing its ruling, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that an appeal would not lie from a
remittitur for which consent had been obtained. 131 U.S. at 30. Clearly, this case does not
establish any binding principles applicable to the Donovan controversy. Similarly, Lewis
should not be considered as authoritative precedent for the Second Circuit's holding in
Donovan, for it involved an attempted appeal by a plaintiff who had actually remitted and
signed an acknowledgment of satisfaction two years earlier. Koenigsberger is distinguishable
in that the remitting claimant attached no conditions or qualifications to his acceptance of
the reduced award. Woodworth, however, appears to be more analogous to Donovan. There,
the plaintiff filed a remittiur "'intended to be without prejudice . . . in any cross proceeding
hereafter prosecuted by him before the Supreme Court of the United States .... '244 U.S.
at 80-81. In narrowly qualifying his consent to the remittitur order, however, Woodworth
reserved only the right to seek review if the defendant appealed the remittitur order. Id.
Furthermore, the plaintiff, having suggested the remittitur device to the court on his own
motion earlier in the litigation, was apparently quite willing to accept a reduced verdict. Id.
at 80. Based upon these factors, the Woodworth decision should not control a modem court's
resolution of the appealability issue. Even if the above arguments are discounted and it is
assumed that these four Supreme Court decisions are compelling precedents for Donovan, it
is submitted that modem judges should thoughtfully reflect upon the wisdom of Justice
Holmes: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469
(1897), quoted in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 540 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976) (Fein-
berg, J., dissenting).
The Fifth Circuit has been the only federal court to discard established procedural
mechanics completely and adopt an "under protest" rule. Interestingly, in adopting this new
rule, the Fifth Circuit gave little credence to these old Supreme Court precedents. See, e.g.,
United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1970), wherein the court
simply assumed that these dated cases were no longer controlling. Moreover, the Woodworth
case was not even cited in two cornerstone Fifth Circuit decisions. See Steinberg v. Indemnity
Ins. Co. of N.A., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966); Delta Eng'r Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). The Second Circuit, in reaffirming the tradi-
tional rule, does not appear to have relied on the early cases. In light of this lack of analysis
by both circuits, the precedential value of these decisions appears to be suspect. The force of
these Supreme Court rulings is further weakened by the Court's decision in Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). The Dimick Court held that additur, the procedure by which a
losing defendant is permitted to supplement an inadequate verdict rather than submit to a
new trial, is unconstitutional. Id. at 477-78. See generally Bender, Additur-The Power of
the Trial Court to Deny a New Trial on the Condition that Damages be Increased, 3 CAL.
W.L. REv. 1 (1967); Note, Additur: Application and Constitutionality, 12 HAsTiNGs L.J. 212
(1960). In the course of its discussion, the Court also evinced some displeasure with the
concept of remittitur. 293 U.S. at 482-85. Since Dimick is a more recent decision than the
old remittitur review cases, it is possible that the Court will take a more restrictive approach
towards remittitur in the future.
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for appellate review of remittiturs, 0 it is likely that appeals would
be commenced only in situations where the trial judge has clearly
abused his discretion. Indeed, the Donovan court's predictions of
greatly burdened courts of appeals are completely speculative.', In
the absence of conclusive data, the majority's rejection of a proce-
dure practiced with apparent efficiency in the busiest of the eleven
circuits seems premature. Even if the majority's apprehension of an
increased appellate caseload is well founded, it should be noted that
the "under protest" rule would decrease the burden on the trial
courts by eliminating unnecessary second trials." Consequently, it
is suggested that the Second Circuit give adequate consideration to
all aspects of remittitur practice, rather than simply adhering to
tradition based upon an inadequate examination of the ramifica-
tions of direct remittitur appeal.
Forced to choose between accepting a reduced verdict and expe-
riencing the expense and delay of a second trial, the claimant con-
fronted with a remittitur order in the Second Circuit is faced with
a truly difficult choice. Many plaintiffs, financially unable to retain
counsel or simply unwilling to risk their initial recoveries, are com-
pelled to agree to the reduced award proposed by the trial judge. 3
In contradistinction, the "under protest" rule practiced in the Fifth
Circuit and advocated by Judge Feinberg substantially mitigates
the coercive effects of conventional practice. By allowing the ag-
grieved plaintiff to accept the remittitur and then challenge the
reduction through an immediate appeal, this rule saves him time,
money, and considerable anxiety.
It is suggested, moreover, that the "under protest" rule, in af-
fording the plaintiff the right to obtain immediate review of a trial
,1 See Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1974),wherein it
was clearly asserted that a lower court would be reversed only if the complaining party could
establish an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. It is also submitted that the expense
involved in prosecuting an appeal will deter most litigants from capriciously challenging
accepted orders of remittitur.
" As Judge Feinberg maintained in Donovan, there is a noticeable lack of substantive
data in the area of remittiturs. Hence, judges and commentators can only speculate about
the effect the "under protest" rule may have upon judicial economy. 536 F.2d at 541 (Fein-
berg, J., dissenting). See generally Columbia Note, supra note 4, at 322-24; Duke Note, supra
note 4, at 1161-62; 44 FoRDHAm L. Rv. 845, 850-51 (1976).
2 See generally Duke Note, supra note 4, at 1161-62.
,3 The coercive nature of this conventional procedure is particularly apparent in cases
where a fairly small remittitur is suggested. See, e.g., Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d
897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949), where a $5,000 reduction was requested. In
such instances, the claimant may very well be unwilling to risk his award. See Columbia
Note, supra note 4, at 312 n.88. See also Duke Note, supra note 4, at 1150.
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judge's discretionary reduction of a jury verdict, more fully imple-
ments the seventh amendment's mandate that "no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."'44 Although
impliedly approved by the judiciary on various occasions, tradi-
tional remittitur practice rests upon a dubious constitutional foun-
dation,45 especially when viewed in light of the Supreme Court's
warning that "any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care."4 The argument that
remittitur may result in an improper limitation on the right to trial
by jury is weakened when the "under protest" rule is utilized. It
would seem that the time-saving aspect of this rule, viz., the abroga-
tion of the requirement that a plaintiff submit to a second trial
before he may obtain judicial review of an order of remittitur, miti-
gates the impact of any possible constitutional infirmity. A claim-
ant having the ability to accept a reduced verdict "under protest"
can bypass the vicious cycle of consecutive new trials which could
conceivably be ordered should subsequent juries likewise award a
recovery deemed exorbitant by the court.47 Thus, by allowing the
claimant to avoid the expense, delay, and inconvenience of contin-
ued litigation, the "under protest" rule not only ameliorates the
coercive effects of traditional practice but also brings remittitur
practice more in line with the dictates of the Constitution.
Arguably, a procedure which permits direct appeal of an order
of remittitur may be violative of the final judgment rule.4" While it
appears that the language of that rule, strictly construed, prohibits
the plaintiff from appealing a remittitur until final judgment has
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
" See note 1 supra.
' Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (citation omitted).
' This argument has been succinctly enunciated by at least one commentator:
So long as there is no limit to the number of retrials that may be ordered, it would
seem that a plaintiff never has a real choice in a remittitur situation. Sooner or
later, even the most determined plaintiff will have to get off the retrial treadmill,
and the only way to do so is to consent to a remittitur or to its non-judicial equiva-
lent, a settlement. In this sense, all remittiturs involve a forced instead of a free
choice; indeed, the whole rationale behind the remittitur procedure is to pressure
the plaintiff into taking less than that which a jury has awarded him.
Chicago Comment, supra note 4, at 380. As accurately noted by the Chicago commentator,
should subsequent juries return excessive verdicts on retrial, the judge could continue to set
them aside. See id. As a practical matter, however, a judge will rarely order more than one
retrial, since it is extremely difficult to justify setting aside a verdict as exorbitant when two
juries have found it to be reasonable.
41 See note 31 supra. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's approach to the final judg-
ment rule, see text accompanying notes 32-35 supra; note 49 infra.
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been entered at the conclusion of the second trial, the "under pro-
test" procedure is actually consonant with the basic policy underly-
ing this federal legislation. 9 Indeed, it is submitted that allowing
immediate appeals from interlocutory orders of remittitur would
foster finality, efficiency, and economy in the judicial process by
preventing subsequent litigation at the trial level.
When one analyzes the proposed "under protest" rule in light
of all of its projected ramifications, the conclusion can be drawn
" The primary purpose behind the final judgment rule is to prevent piecemeal litigation
of controversies and thereby eliminate unnecessary delay. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949); Peterson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 268 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1959). Clearly, when a claimant opts to submit to
another trial rather than remit, judicial efficiency and finality are thwarted. Moreover, fol-
lowing the second trial, subsequent appeals may be taken by both parties to the litigation.
These contingencies, it is submitted, are avoided by the "under protest" rule. In contending
that finality is indeed promoted by the new rule, the Fifth Circuit has declared:
[I]f the plaintiff accepts the remittitur under protest, the final judgment entered
thereon would be appealable, and the order requiring remittitur could be reviewed
in that appeal. By this procedure, the determination of the appeals court would be
final. If the remittitur was in order, the plaintiff has agreed to it, the judgment
would be final, and no new trial would be required. If the trial court erred in
ordering the remittitur, the appellate court could set aside the judgment and order
that a judgment be entered on the jury verdict. Again, no new trial would be
necessary to conclude the litigation.
Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281, 1283 (5th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted). For a mild criticism
of the reasoning expressed in Wiggs, see note 34 supra.
Recognizing the hardship that can result from strict application of the final judgment
rule, Congress has created a limited number of exceptions to the finality requirement. For
example, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) sanctions review of interlocutory orders granting or
denying injunctive relief. Similarly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), if "a district
judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable.., shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially ad-
vance the ultimate termination of the litigation," he may certify the issue to permit an
interlocutory appeal which the court of appeals has discretionary power to hear. There are
also a small number of judicially created exceptions to the final judgment rule. See, e.g.,
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964) (review of order allowed where
that order is necessary for continuation of the litigation); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (review of collateral orders permitted where irreparable harm will
result if the appeal is denied); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945)
(appeal lies from interlocutory order directing the transfer of physical property); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (appeal
sanctioned where the district court order would otherwise terminate the litigation). In en-
grafting these judicial exceptions, the major inquiry has involved a balancing of "the in-
convenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying
justice by delay on the other." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1974),
quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). Measured against
this standard, it is suggested that the "under protest" rule could conceivably constitute a new
judicial exception to the finality rule, since allowing immediate appeals from orders of remit-
titur would promote justice without fostering delay or inefficiency.
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that such a procedural mechanism will best serve the interests of
justice. By providing aggrieved claimants with a realistic opportu-
nity to challenge a trial court judge's discretionary use of the remit-
titur device, it is submitted that the rights of litigants will be better
balanced 0 and federal practice brought further within the guide-
lines of the seventh amendment." Hopefully, when again faced with
an opportunity to rule on the appealability of judgments entered
pursuant to remittitur orders, the Second Circuit will reconsider
and perhaps reverse the Donovan decision. 2
Joseph C. Petillo
Editor's Note. As The Second Circuit Note goes to print, the Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari and summarily affirmed
Donovan. 45 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (per curiam). Al-
though the Court rejected the "under protest" rule, it failed to ex-
plore the many ramifications of traditional practice. Had oral argu-
ments been permitted, perhaps the Court would have recognized the
coercive nature of conventional procedure and reassessed the prece-
dential value of the dated decisions upon which it exclusively relied.
In fact, the "under protest" rule merely gives the plaintiff the same right and ability
to appeal that the defendant has always enjoyed. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text
supra.
51 Permitting the plaintiff to seek direct review of a remittitur, thereby depriving his
adversary of a second jury trial, is a concern which has been emphatically voiced by many
defendants. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 5, Evans v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1976). Should the plaintiff be successful on his appeal, it is argued, the excessive jury verdict
will be reinstated; however, even if the plaintiff loses on appeal, he will be guaranteed the
reduced verdict. Id. at 522. See generally Columbia Note, supra note 4, at 322. Judge Fein-
berg, however, addressing this issue in his dissent in Donovan, pointed out that if the remit-
ting claimant loses on appeal, the already reduced recovery is theoretically a justifiable one.
536 F.2d at 540 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). In addition, it is submitted that should the appel-
late court find the trial judge to have abused his discretion in ordering the remittitur, rein-
statement of the original verdict does not prejudice the defendant.
52 It is interesting to note that several states have adopted liberal approaches to appeals
from remittiturs. See Mulkerin v. Somerset Tire Serv., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 173, 264 A.2d
748 (App. Div. 1970) (review of remittitur order permitted on cross-appeal); Plesko v. City
of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 130 (1963) (cross-appeal allowed); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A, § 366(b)(2)(ii) (Smith-Hurd 1976) (direct appeals permitted); NEB. REV. STAT. §
25-1929 (1943) (cross-appeals allowed); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5501(a)(5) (McKinney 1963)
(cross-appeals allowed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955) (acceptance "under protest" and
direct appeals sanctioned); TEx. R. Civ. P. 328 (cross-appeals permitted). See generally 49
N.C.L. REV. 141 (1970).
